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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF	)	Case No.
CALIFORNIA,	)	
	)	MOTION IN LIMINE:
Plaintiff,	)	EXCLUDING USE OF
	)	SUBTERFUGE AROUND <u>BLEDSON</u>
vs.	)	AND LIMITING EVIDENCE OF
	)	MYTHS & CHILD ACCOMMODATION
	)	SYNDROME
	)	
Defendant.	)	Date:
	)	Time:
	)	Dept:

The defense moves for a protective order that:

1. The prosecution not be allowed to introduce the equivalent of a profile of a child molester or victim of a molest under the subterfuge of dispelling numerous myths about child molesters or victims of molest.

2. If the prosecution intends on introducing expert testimony to dispel alleged myths, that:

a. There be a hearing outside the presence of the jury for the prosecution to specify the alleged myth and a contested hearing as to whether or not it is actually a myth.

b. The testimony be narrowly limited to only those items found by the court to actually be myths.

c. That the testimony to dispel a myth be limited to victims as a class.

**I**

The defense incorporates herein by reference the following related in limine motions also on file: **Insert applicable names such as Motion to Exclude Expert Witness Opinion That The Child Is A Victim of Sexual Molest, Motion to Exclude Evidence of Anatomical**

1 Dolls, and Motion to Exclude Evidence of Profiles of Child  
2 Molesters.

3 II

4 USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY TO DISPEL MYTHS

5 In **People vs. Bledsoe** (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 249, the  
6 California Supreme Court held that rape trauma syndrome was  
7 inadmissible to show a rape had actually occurred, but could be  
8 admissible to "disabus[e] the jury of some widely held  
9 misconceptions about rape and rape trauma victims so that it may  
10 evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths."  
11 Subsequently, reviewing courts have held valid the use of expert  
12 testimony to dispel myths about child molest victims. However, the  
13 testimony is limited to victims as a class and not a particular  
14 alleged victim. **People vs. Roscoe** (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1093,  
15 1098-1100; **People vs. Gray** (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 213, 218; **People**  
16 **vs. Coleman** (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 144; and **People vs. Stark** (1989)  
17 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116-117. In addition, testimony not properly  
18 limited is excludable pursuant to Evidence Code section 352.  
19 (**Roscoe**, supra, at p. 1100.)

20 III

21 LIMITS ON EVIDENCE TO DISPEL MYTHS

22 In **People vs. Bowker** (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 394, 249 Cal.  
23 Rptr. 886, 891, the court considered whether or not the testimony  
24 of a child abuse accommodation syndrome expert fell within the  
25 **Bledsoe** exception permitting such testimony for the narrow purpose  
26 "of disabusing the jury of misconceptions as to how child victims  
27 react to abuse." (Id., at p. 392.) The court reaffirmed that  
28 **Bledsoe** must be read to reject the use of CSAAS evidence as a

1 predictor of child abuse," and found the expert's testimony had  
2 exceeded the **Bledsoe** exception holding that "at a minimum the  
3 evidence must be targeted to a specific 'myth' or 'misconception'  
4 suggested by the evidence." (Id., at pp. 393-394.) The court  
5 further held:

6 "In the typical criminal case, however, it is the  
7 People's burden to identify the myth or misconception the  
8 evidence is designed to rebut. Where there is no danger  
of jury confusion, there is simply no need for the expert  
testimony." (Id., at p. 394.)

9  
10 In determining that the expert's testimony erroneously  
11 exceeded the permissible limits of the **Bledsoe** exception, the  
12 **Bowker** court found that the expert's testimony was tailored to fit  
13 the children in that particular case, asked for sympathy, asked  
14 that children be believed and by describing each aspect of CSAAS  
15 theory provided a scientific framework the jury could use to  
16 predict a molest occurred. The court ruled that this evidence  
17 should have been excluded. (Id., at pp. 394-395.)

#### 18 IV

#### 19 JURY INSTRUCTION

20 When testimony is introduced to dispel a myth the jury must be  
21 instructed not to use that evidence to predict a molest has been  
22 committed.

23 "Beyond the tailoring of the evidence itself, the jury  
24 must be instructed simply and directly that the expert's  
25 testimony is not intended and should not be used to  
26 determine whether the victim's molestation claims is  
27 true. The jurors must understand that CSAAS research  
28 approaches the issue from a perspective opposite to that  
of the jury. CSAAS assumes a molestation has occurred  
and seeks to describe and explain common reactions of  
children to the experience. (See *In re Sara M.*, supra,  
194 Cal.App.3d at p. 593, 239 Cal.Rptr. 605.) The  
evidence is admissible solely for the purpose of showing  
that the victim's reactions as demonstrated by the  
evidence are not inconsistent with having been molested."

1 (Bowker, supra, at p. 394; **People vs. Housley** (1992) 6  
2 Cal.App.4th 947, 958-959 [such instruction required sua  
3 sponte.)

4 **CONCLUSION**

5 In sum, the prosecution cannot circumvent the limits placed on  
6 expert testimony in child molest cases by claiming each element of  
7 a profile of a child molester or child molest victim is a myth and  
8 under this subterfuge introduce expert opinion that the jury could  
9 use to predict that a molest had occurred.

10 Dated:

11 Respectfully submitted,

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14 Attorney for Defendant  
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